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
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## THE FUTURE OF EUROPE AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

BY

COLONEL CHARLES C. McCLOSKEY III

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THE FUTURE OF EUROPE AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

An Individual Study Project  
Intended for Publication

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013  
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# ABSTRACT

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The world region which will most affect the national security of the United States in the next twenty-five years is Europe. Europe is the key region because of history and heritage, economics, geographic location, the military threat, technology growth and increasing European unity. All these factors tie U.S. national interests to Europe, moreso than any other region. The vision of Europe twenty-five years hence is of an economically vibrant region, comfortable dealing with both East and West in trade and all other aspects of international relations, militarily less dependent on the United States, acting more as a unified region than separate countries and an emerging superpower in its own right. To safeguard its national security, the United States must respond to this future Europe in several ways. It must revise its European military strategy to include the phased withdrawal of all major ground forces, enhance American economic competitiveness while simultaneously stimulating East-West trade, adequately resource the national diplomatic effort and establish and sustain a consensus of support for this new strategy among the American people and their representatives.

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## INTRODUCTION

When a citizen of the United States opens the front door and looks out across the world, the view is one of staggering complexity and uncertainty. The international politics are confusing: some past friends have become enemies (Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua) and other current friends are becoming less congenial (Greece, Spain, New Zealand); some past enemies have become friends (Germany, Japan) and other current enemies (the Soviet Union, China) appear now to be less threatening. Economics seems equally muddled: Europe and Japan are dependent on Middle East oil, but it is the U.S. who has kept the sea lanes open; American heavy industry (steel, shipbuilding) has cut back, shut down or closed and in many cases has been replaced by overseas competitors; the U.S. welcomes import trade from foreign countries but many of these same countries impose costly barriers to prevent our reciprocal exports. Diplomatically the U.S. seems concerned and industrious but generates few concrete results (witness the nine year Central American problem). What little military aid the U.S. provides is concentrated in just a few countries. Militarily, the nation has experienced its greatest peacetime buildup in history and yet the Soviet threat matches or exceeds our capability, while the cost for this unprecedented American buildup has been a massive deficit which has yet to be solved.



Given this disconcerting if not ominous view of the present, what does the future hold for America? Specifically, what region or regions of the world will most shape American destiny, and what can America do in national security terms to best equip itself for the sustainment of its ideals and way of life in the decades to come?

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the key and critical role that Europe will play in the future of the United States and the consequent actions that the United States must take to best protect its own national security interests. This paper seeks to demonstrate that Europe twenty-five years hence will be economically vibrant, comfortable dealing with both East and West in trade and in all other facets of international relations, militarily less dependent on the United States, especially in terms of forward deployed conventional forces, and a super-power in its own right. The actions the United States must thus take to enhance its own national security include:

- Restructure the national defense establishment to greatly curtail foreign deployments of forces while maintaining offensive and defensive strategic deterrence.

- Promote increased international trade by revitalizing American industry.

- Rejuvenate American energy and resources devoted to diplomacy.

- Develop a supportive consensus on America's European strategy into and through the twenty-first century.

#### WHY EUROPE?

All regions of the world command U.S. attention. The major regions with which the United States must be concerned are the Soviet Union (including the Warsaw Pact nations), the Peoples' Republic of China, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, Northeast Asia including Japan, Southeast Asia including Australia and New Zealand, South America, Central America and North America. Of these eleven regions, why is it that Europe, more than any other, will most shape and influence the destiny of the United States?

The reasons for this are history and heritage, economics, geographic location, the military threat, technology growth and increasing European unity.

As a preface, it is useful to define the term "Europe." For this discussion, Europe includes the British Isles, France, West Germany, the Benelux countries, Scandinavia (Norway, Sweden and Denmark) plus Finland, Iceland, Switzerland, Austria, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey. These countries have in common political freedom, albeit tenuous in some, manifested by democratic governments and open participation in international commerce. The other European nations (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania

and western Russia) are included under the Soviet Union region, for they practice the communist form of government, do not engage freely in international commerce and are greatly influenced by the will of the Soviet Union.

Europe has been the leader of world civilization for the last six centuries. From the Renaissance until the post-World War II era, the bulk of the world's wealth, culture, technology and advancement has stemmed from Europe. While Europe was divided into two camps because of World War II, the influence of European thinking, both in the West and in the East, remains. The United States was founded upon European values and traditions with our initial laws and lawmaking following the European design. Much of America's population is descended from European forebears, and family, custom and culture still keep ties to the "Old World" strong. Likewise, a similar attraction for Europe is found among the Russians. When Czar Peter the Great began the modernization of Russia, he followed the European model. The current Soviet leader, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, writes:

"Russia's trade, cultural and political links with other European nations and states have deep roots in history. We are Europeans. Old Russia was united with Europe by Christianity, and the millenium of its arrival in the land of our ancestors will be marked next year [1988]. The history of Russia is an organic part of the great European history."<sup>1</sup>

The attraction of the Soviet Union to Europe, shown in this and many other ways, both peaceful and aggressive, is of great interest to the United States.

The economics of Europe are also of major concern to the United States. Collectively, the European economy is the largest in the world, surpassing the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and all the Third World nations taken as a whole. The following table highlights this economic situation:

Gross Domestic Product in Billions of 1980 U.S. Dollars<sup>2</sup>

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Europe	3784	3877	3964	4052	4129	4210
U.S.	3041	3123	3207	3323	3401	3423
U.S.S.R.	1228	1268	1295	1319	1348	1378
Japan	1285	1316	1349	1395	1436	1468
Third World	2098	2132	2169	2242	2322	2405

Further, U.S.-European trade is well-established and American business cannot afford to ignore the world's largest market.

In geographic terms, Europe is close to the United States, providing trade and basing advantages, but more importantly, encircles the Western flank of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. To gain access to the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union must exit the GIUK (Greenland-

Iceland-United Kingdom) gap, the Baltic Sea or the Bosphorus, choke points all controlled by Europe and its allies.

The major military threat opposing the United States today and in the future is the Soviet Union. No other nation except the U.S. can match the military might, measured in strategic weapons capability, of the Soviets. In conventional terms, the Soviets surpass all nations in both military personnel and equipment. In the past, the Soviets have been clear and blunt about their desire to destroy the West and its way of life. Their quick and brutal suppression of movements toward democracy (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Afghanistan) as well as their use of surrogate forces (Cubans, East Germans, North Koreans) to export communism have underscored this aim. The key region where the Soviet expansion must be checked is Europe, for it is here that democracy and freedom meet head on with communism and repression. While Europe hopefully will not again become a battleground of armies, it is already a battleground of ideologies. Here, in Europe, is where the West confronts the East face-to-face.

The growth of technology also makes Europe critical to U.S. national security. Two of the acknowledged members of the world's nuclear club are European--England and France. Any serious discussion of nuclear capabilities or nuclear disarmament must factor in Europe. Europe is also a leader in heavy industry, electronics, aviation and space technologies. Not only does the United States encourage, compete with and consume

European technology, more importantly that technology is coveted by the Soviet Union, and unchecked export of technology from Europe to the East could do serious harm to Western security.

Lastly, the trend toward increased European unity underscores its importance to the United States. Increasingly, Europeans are bonding closer together and acting in the international arena more as a region than as individual countries. This is seen militarily, particularly with the maturing and strength of NATO; economically with the growth and success of the European Common Market; diplomatically, with the routine and frequent consultation among Europeans over issues of extra-European concern, such as the establishment of computer data banks to fight international terrorism<sup>3</sup>; and politically, with the practical compromise among European nations in recognition of one nation's policy impact on the health and survival of fellow European nations. As European regionalism develops and strengthens, the United States must recognize that it will be dealing with an emerging superpower.

David Denoon, in his book Constraints On Strategy, summarizes effectively the importance of Europe to the United States:

"Why are developments in Europe so critical for U.S. national security? Europe is crucial because, at present, the United States and its allies can handle the Soviet conventional threat outside the European landmass. Although a conflict in the Persian Gulf poses particular difficulties, in East Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Mediterranean, the United States and cooperating nations have distinct strategic advantages.

Europe is also a geopolitical prize. Its skilled population, income-generating capacity, advanced armaments

industry, and location (limiting Soviet naval access to the Atlantic, Baltic, and Mediterranean) are all vital attributes. Europe's future will also have an important psychological effect on non-Marxist countries around the globe. In addition, the ancestral ties that most Americans have to Europe create a political bond that cannot be evaluated in purely military terms. It is here that Western Europe's special relationship with the United States comes into play."<sup>4</sup>

The question of why Europe is the region most important to the national security of the United States has been examined from the perspectives of history and heritage, economics, geography, the military threat, technological growth and increasing European unity. While there are strong arguments that America's first concern should be in other regions, no region impacts more on the vital interests of the U.S. than Europe. Will this situation remain so in the future? The following discussion outlines why it will.

### The Future of Europe

Similar to the mistral of southern France, a strong wind of change is blowing over all of Europe. Consider the following:

"France, West Germany Expand Defense Cooperation, Paris, Jan. 23 [1988], Washington Post, p. A20--France and West Germany, celebrating 25 years of postwar friendship, strengthened their ties today with formation of a high-level military commission to coordinate Franco-German policies on nuclear disarmament and other defense matters.

President Francois Mitterand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, at ceremonies here marking the anniversary of their two countries' friendship treaty, also announced creation of an economic commission to promote increased cooperation on trade and monetary policy. . . .

The French government responded enthusiastically, for example, to Kohl's suggestion last June for a Franco-German brigade to symbolize the two countries' growing defense ties. . . .

Officials announced today that the 3000-4000 soldier brigade's first commander will be a Frenchman, Brig. Gen. Jean Sengeisen. He will be replaced by a German in two years on a rotation basis, they said. The unit is to begin operations Oct. 1. . . .

Kohl said Franco-German defense cooperation should lead toward 'a common European defense and a European army, including our European friends and in the framework of confident relations between partners with the United States.'"<sup>5</sup>

"Soviets, Germans Warming to Each Other As Ostpolitik Comes Out of a Deep Freeze, Bonn [Jan. 19, 1988], Wall Street Journal, p. 24--You don't have to look hard these days to find evidence of the new vigor in relations between West Germany and the East bloc.

Examples pop up almost daily, and yesterday's was provided by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Mr. Shevardnadze . . . told several hundred German businessmen that the Soviet Union needs German investment. He reminded them of business cooperation, which, he said, had been so fruitful before World War II. He warned against bowing to Western pressure to restrict technology exports to the East."<sup>6</sup>

"U.S. to Withdraw 72 Jet Fighters from Spanish Bases, Washington, Jan. 14 [1988], New York Times, p. A1--The United States, after months of fruitless negotiations with Spain, has decided to accede to Spanish demands and withdraw 72 F-16 jet fighters based in that NATO country, Defense and State Department officials said today."<sup>7</sup>

These recent headline stories are samplings from a stream of events of the last several years pointing to significant change and evolution in European affairs and the world balance of power. The direction of change appears to be as follows. Given the overcommitment of the United States<sup>8</sup>, the desire of the Soviet Union to develop a viable national economy<sup>9</sup>, the major change in the nuclear equation with the signing of the INF



(Intermediate Range Nuclear Force) treaty, the solid and skilled technology base of Europe<sup>10</sup>, and the sophistication of Europe in international trade and politics, then the likely course of world events is the gradual withdrawal of American forces from Europe (particularly ground forces), increased trade between Europe and the Soviet bloc, strong movement toward regional cooperation in Europe (to include conventional defense) and the emergence of Europe as, if not a full superpower, then a superpower in all terms save the size of its nuclear arsenal.

The significant trends that will greatly influence the future of Europe are important to mention here. These trends are population, East-West trade, the electronics revolution, changing roles and expectations for the superpowers, European regionalism, the development and exploitation of space, and externalities.

European population into the twenty-first century is expected to grow only slightly, with a growth rate of 0.2% for 1995-2000.<sup>11</sup> Several nations, including both East and West Germany, are forecast to have negative population growth.<sup>12</sup> The U.S. and U.S.S.R. populations should grow at slightly higher rates of 0.7% each.<sup>13</sup> Most regional population growth in the world is expected to be in the lesser developed areas, specifically Africa (3.1%), Latin America (1.9%), East Asia (1.1%) and South Asia (1.7%)<sup>14</sup>, which only indirectly impacts on Europe. The significance of this comes primarily in terms of food. Europe can feed itself and looks to be able to do so far

into the future. Further, it has the economic wherewithal to trade for any food shortfalls it might have. The same is true for the U.S., but is questionable for the Soviet Union, given their economic difficulties and the sensitivity of their agriculture to the severity of the Russian climate.<sup>15</sup> There is a direct connection between nutrition, health, productivity and economic well-being<sup>16</sup> and Europe looks to be in good shape for many years to come.

East-West trade should increase, although U.S. concerns over technology transfer to the Soviets will have to be overcome. The profit potential certainly argues for it, given the tangency of the European and Soviet/Warsaw Pact markets. Further, both partners desire it, the Europeans for not only profits, but also to reestablish the old ties to the East and to begin to restore the past glory of a Europe without mined borders. The Soviets, for their part, need the trade and technology of the West to energize their dormant economy. To move forward, the Soviets must inspire their people to more productivity. This inspiration can come from the rewards of freer trade, such as modern and plentiful consumer goods, elimination of staple shortages and positive production incentives. But these can come only after trade and technology advance, the apparent goals of General Secretary Gorbachev's "perestroika."

The electronics revolution continues to shrink the world. Satellites, computers and the resultant instant communication by voice or data have changed the world forever. There is great

opportunity for rapid advancement in all fields of life, although it has come with the string of continuous outside scrutiny and criticism. While anyone can do anything, thanks to electronics, everyone knows what everyone else is doing. This trend is a boon to Europe. They are in a central position to exploit electronics for their own benefit, drawing the best in theory, technology and application from both East and West. Their own electronic industries are established, they have satellites in orbit and they look to remain world leaders in this field.

The roles and expectations of the superpowers have changed. The Soviet Union is now the world's preeminent military power, matched by only the United States in nuclear arms and superior to all nations in conventional forces. And yet their economy wallows and they are far down the list of economic powers. On the other hand, the United States has struggled mightily to modernize its forces and has done so at great cost in resources. It now finds itself with a staggering federal deficit and at best only at military parity with the Soviet Union. And there are strong pressures from the U.S. Congress to curtail significantly further resources provided for national defense. For both nations, following on the sobering effects of Chernobyl, the INF treaty likely is ushering in a new era in superpower relations. It is arguable that large scale conventional forces and nuclear weapons are both unusable.<sup>17</sup> The U.S. and Soviet Union, although still major adversaries, must accommodate more to coexist in a changed world. In their roles as co-helmsmen for the course of the

planet, they now must take more counsel from their fellow regional travelers, particularly Europe, who rides between them.

Europeans continue to move closer together. While they recognize the risks and challenges they face in unification (loss of U.S. support, fielding of their own defenses, threat from the Soviet military might, old hatred toward Germany), there appears to be a willingness to face these challenges maturely with regional interests clearly in the forefront. This does imply the yielding of some national sovereignty which will come to pass, but with difficulty.

Lastly, the development and exploitation of space is a trend which impacts greatly on Europe. With the development of the Soviet anti-ballistic missile defense system and the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the relationships among Europe, the U.S. and the Soviet Union will change. The U.S. and the Soviet Union will in theory be protected from each other, but Europe will not be from either. Will Europe then need a similar defense? Will Eastern Europe? These questions will clearly challenge the involved governments for years to come, but throughout these years will likely draw the Europeans into increasingly unified action.

External events may impact significantly on Europe's future. These events include the AIDS epidemic, Third World problems, global flash points and terrorism. The AIDS epidemic is a potentially devastating destructive force. With the exponential growth of cases, the apparent 100% mortality of the

disease and the uncertainty of a medical solution, the effect of AIDS on the future of Europe and the world is unknown. Some major areas which could be affected include population, leadership, resource allocation and travel restrictions. The Third World has a serious food shortage due to increasing population. In addition, they have strong aspirations for national development. These problems and hopes could lead to major difficulties or opportunities for the rest of the world. Trouble at any of the world's flash points, such as the Persian Gulf, the Mid-East, Central America or Korea, could have secondary effects on Europe via trade restrictions, requests for assistance and superpower crises. Terrorism generates similar problems, but additionally commands resources on a steady basis for countermeasures, generates delicate diplomatic situations and puts intense pressures on legitimate governments. What future externalities will befall Europe is unknown, but Europe continues to move toward a regional approach in planning for their possible occurrence.

To summarize, Europe is changing rapidly and the next twenty-five years promise a Europe markedly different from today. It will be a Europe with less reliance on America for its defense, with reduced barriers and increased trade with the Eastern bloc, with growing development of regional cooperation and behavior and with a rising and stronger role in world affairs.

## Implications for U.S. National Security

As the winds of change blow in Europe, the boughs in the United States must bend. As Europe changes, so must the U.S., for it is in the U.S. national interest to do so. The areas where the U.S. must change, in order not to imperil its future, are four. First, the U.S. must restructure its European military commitment and strategy. Second, it must revitalize American international competitiveness and promote increased East-West trade. Third, it must reenergize American diplomacy. And, lastly, it must educate and win the support of the American electorate and population on a national strategy for Europe: where the nation is going (objectives), how it intends to get there (concepts) and how much it will cost (resources).

Many American voices are calling for change in our military commitment to Europe. James H. Webb, Jr., the former Secretary of the Navy, has postulated that:

"Although the NATO alliance is one of the keystones of our military structure, we need to remind ourselves that we are more than a European nation. Moreover, we should bear in mind that no region is better equipped to reassume a great share of the burden of its own defense than Western Europe."<sup>18</sup>

Melvyn Krauss, in How NATO Weakens the West, is more specific:

"Washington should announce a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops over a period of, say, five years."<sup>19</sup>

Even Europeans are beginning to talk this way. A West European ambassador recently stated:

"I would find it altogether extraordinary if the United States still had 326,000 troops in Europe in the year 2000. I think that feeling is very widespread."<sup>20</sup>

Likewise, the movement toward a European regional approach to defense is growing. It was reported in October 1987 that:

"Defense and foreign ministers of seven West European allies resolved today to speak with a stronger voice in military and disarmament decisions affecting their continent."<sup>21</sup>

Given the future of Europe which has been outlined, the implications for the U.S. military commitment to Europe are that landpower forces need to be greatly reduced and the military strategy revised. This is because conventional defense is becoming increasingly unaffordable to the U.S. and increasingly affordable to Europe. Melvyn Krauss, again from How NATO Weakens The West, clarifies:

"European underinvestment in defense is not an unavoidable consequence of an inherent resource inferiority, but the result of the perverse 'incentive effect' of U.S. military guarantees: When the United States pledged itself to the defense of Western Europe, it gave its European allies an irresistible incentive to substitute American military spending for their own."<sup>22</sup>

Military actions and strategy revisions the U.S. should undertake now are as follows:

- Within a transition period of five years, withdraw two divisions of American ground forces from Europe and turn over that defense role to the Europeans. Establish a long-range goal to withdraw all U.S. ground forces, subject to similar

withdrawal by the Soviet Union of their forces from Warsaw Pact nations. Forces in Berlin should remain and continue to serve their tripwire function.

- Maintain the nuclear shield from U.S. submarines and aircraft in place, as well as contingency plans and options.

- Retain basing rights on the perimeter of Europe (Iceland, the British Isles, the Azores, Turkey), primarily for stationing and servicing of nuclear delivery vehicles.

- Continue to develop new high technology systems, particularly "low-observable" systems, "smart" weapons, ballistic missile defense [SDI] and space capabilities for wartime operations (as highlighted in Discriminate Deterrence, the report of the President's Commission on Integrated Long-Range Strategy).<sup>23</sup>

- Negotiate contingency basing and overflight rights to allow the U.S. to reinforce and respond to other national security emergencies.

The U.S. must also change economically. It needs to restore a favorable balance of trade by becoming more competitive on world markets and it needs to encourage and support greater East-West trade by moderating its current restrictive policies. The effect of these changes will be the enhancement of both European and U.S. economic strength and the promotion of U.S. national security.

America for the last several years has been a net importer of world goods and services. The prime reason for this is



because America has been outhustled by foreign competitors. American consumers, whether individual, institutional or corporate, thrive on quality and value. Since America, in many cases, was not able to deliver the desired quality and value, a flood of foreign products which could, such as Japanese electronics, Korean clothing and German automobiles, flowed into America. Protectionist legislation, often proposed, is an easy quick fix, but a short-sighted and impermanent one. For the long haul, America needs to work hard at becoming more competitive in the technologies it does best. Costs need to be cut, productivity enhanced, government subsidies reduced and concessions made by both management and labor. Only then will the nation be in a position to compete and negotiate effectively in world trade arenas.

Simultaneously and in direct recognition of the growing role of Europe, the U.S. needs a new approach to East-West trade. The new approach needs to be the up-front encouragement of expanded Europe-Soviet/Warsaw Pact trade. There are strong reasons for this action. Robert Hormats, vice chairman of Goldman Sachs International and a former senior National Security Council staff member, writes:

"If we maintain our security, cohesion and standards for participation in global economic institutions, while our private sectors take advantage of opportunities for increased trade, investment and contacts with Soviet officials, we can put Moscow's intentions and reforms to an honest test--and even give them a boost--without compromising our own interests."<sup>24</sup>

Paul Bracken, professor of public policy and political science at Yale University, further states that:

"Greater economic and financial ties between Eastern Europe and the West could make East European and Russian goals even less congruent that they already are, something that would reduce confidence in the success of a military attack. That is, if Moscow could not count on the reliability of Pact states in a crisis, this could be a benefit to the West easily worth 30 or more divisions."<sup>25</sup>

In other words, increased East-West trade holds inherent advantages for all players which outweigh the associated risks. Like the INF treaty, it is can be a "win-win" situation.

Economic actions the U.S. needs to take now are as follows:

- Increase American competitiveness in world markets through enhancements of the quality and value of products and services.

- Promote and encourage expanded East-West trade.

Diplomatically, the U.S. needs rejuvenation to play effectively in European and Soviet relations in the future. The problem has been one not of expertise but of a lack of resources. While the will for diplomatic effectiveness has been there, the way has not. Two areas need serious attention and corrective action.

First is the funding of the State Department per se. In recent years the State Department has suffered severe budget reductions to the point of closing overseas embassies with accompanying personnel reductions and loss of diplomatic effectiveness. Secretary of State George Shultz underscores the seriousness of the problem:

"The budget crisis is perhaps the most urgent--and the least recognized--foreign policy problem facing our nation today. These cuts have seriously impaired our ability to provide necessary economic and military support for our allies and friends in need. By doing so, they risk our continued access to vital military bases and facilities overseas that would require tremendous expense and effort for us to try to replace or compensate for. They signal--correctly or not--a declining U.S. interest in supporting our friends and allies in strategically important regions.

And the effect of these cuts go further. They hamper our war on drug traffickers and on terrorists. They restrict our attempts both to promote democratic values and reforms overseas and to expand trade and develop jobs. And, by forcing us to close overseas posts and to curtail necessary training, such as language training, they are weakening not only our career Foreign Service but the government's very ability to follow, analyze, and understand developments in a fast-changing international environment."<sup>26</sup>

A candidate tradeoff for increased State Department funding would be a portion of the cost savings from the European U.S. force reductions mentioned above. The increased resources would allow a more effective diplomatic effort worldwide, such that more weighted effort toward Europe and the Soviet Union could be applied.

The second major change required is in administration of the U.S. security assistance program. Over the last ten years, Congress has restricted increasing amounts of this program to the point where, in the 1987 budget, 62% is specifically earmarked for Egypt and Israel, 17% for Greece and Turkey and 6% for Pakistan, leaving only 15% of the total remaining for the President's discretionary use.<sup>27</sup> The impacts of this have already begun to be seen. Some commitments the U.S. has made for military security assistance cannot be honored. For example,

Portugal this year will receive \$117 million, marking the third straight year of declining military aid assistance for that country, despite a U.S. promise in 1983 of an annual program of \$205 million.<sup>28</sup> This has led to increasing difficulty in renewing basing agreements for the strategically important airbase in the Azores. In the Third World, the anemic aid program explains why the U.S. is hard pressed by the Soviets toward cementing solid relationships with developing nations. Without a coherent and flexible economic and military aid program, U.S. diplomacy becomes much less credible and far more difficult to execute.

In order to meet the challenges of the increasing role of Europe, the U.S. must devote more resources to diplomacy. Specific diplomatic actions the U.S. needs to take now are:

- Adequately resource the State Department.
- Give the President more flexibility in executing the the security assistance program.

The final area where the U.S. needs change is in the education of its people. The electorate of America needs to know what the future vision of the nation is, why it is that so much of our attention needs to be directed toward Europe, how we intend to implement the policies and objectives of the vision and how it will all be resourced. Certainly this is a challenging and complex task, but it is one which must be done, for without the support of the American people, it is likely that the vision, the strategy, plans and programs for dealing with a new Europe, will not be able to be implemented. Complicating this is the

long term nature of the vision. Americans tend to want quick results, but many of the issues will take years to resolve (for example, withdrawal of American ground forces). Moreover, Presidential administrations will not likely last long enough to see plans fulfilled.

The U.S. needs to take the following actions to generate national support for its strategy toward Europe:

- Package the strategy in a comprehensive and coherent manner.
- Present the strategy clearly to the Congress, national leaders and the American public, to the point where there is consensus support.
- Revise and reinforce the strategy annually and reinform the Congress, national leaders and the public to maintain consensus.

#### Summary

This paper has attempted to do three things:

- To show why the future of Europe is key to the future national security of the United States.
- To predict, in general terms, what the future of Europe will be.
- To outline implications for the future of the U.S. and actions the U.S. needs to take to best enhance its national security.

Europe is key to the future of the United States for several strong reasons. These are history and heritage, economics, geographic location, the military threat, technology growth and increasing European unity.

The future of Europe sees the assumption by the region of a greatly increased role in its own defense, increased trade between Europe and the Soviet bloc nations, strong movement toward regional cooperation and the emerging of Europe as a superpower in its own right.

The implications for the United States are requirements to restructure its military strategy for Europe, to revitalize American international economic competitiveness and to promote increased East-West trade, to reenergize American diplomacy and to educate and win the support of the American people on the national vision for Europe.

The major actions the U.S. needs to take are:

- Begin a phased withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Europe while maintaining for the near term European-based sea and air deterrent forces. The first phase should be the withdrawal of two divisions within five years.
- Negotiate contingency basing and overflight rights.
- Enhance the quality and value of American goods and services.
- Support expanded East-West trade.

- Provide adequate resources for the U.S. diplomatic effort, specifically the State Department budget and the Security Assistance program.

- Establish a consensus of support for the new European strategy among the electorate and their representatives.

### Conclusion

Twenty-five years from now, when a citizen of the United States looks out across the world, the view need no longer be of staggering complexity and uncertainty. Should the strategy and vision above be formulated and followed, the world will likely be a safer place to live and better able to satisfy the needs of its inhabitants. Problems will remain, but the world would be one of less tension, reduced threat of nuclear destruction, better economic conditions, improved international relations between the U.S. and the world and a American nation united and secure behind its leadership in its quest for world peace, prosperity and freedom.

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